Projects on Counter Risk Insights

Ambiguous incidents in the Baltic Sea region

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

The question

In the first hours and days after an incident, decision-makers have to act on fragments. A ship may have dragged its anchor across a pipeline, or drones may have been seen over an airport, and the cause is unclear. This project asks what could be known at each point after three such incidents, which explanations the evidence supported, and how long it took before an accident could be told apart from an attack.

Russian Telegram watch

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

The question

Telegram is where Russia’s war is discussed most openly in Russian. Military bloggers report from the front, official channels set the line, and regional channels carry local news that national media leave out. This project asks what these channels reveal, earlier than other sources, about Russian forces on NATO’s northern and eastern flank, and how they portray Denmark and the Nordic countries.

Why it matters

Signs of unit movements, losses or a new round of mobilisation often appear first as local detail, such as a recruitment drive, a notice from a regional authority or a convoy filmed from the roadside. Narratives matter as well. How Russian channels talk about Greenland, the Danish straits or the inspection of shadow fleet tankers shows which Danish decisions Moscow notices, and how it presents them to a Russian audience.

Baselines at Russia's northern bases

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

The question

Warning depends on knowing what normal looks like. This project builds a record of activity at three Russian bases on the flank. Baltiysk is the main base of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad, Severomorsk is the headquarters of the Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, and Olenya is an airbase for long-range bombers south of Murmansk. The project asks how many large vessels and aircraft are normally present at each, how that number varies, and what a meaningful departure from the pattern would look like.

Who runs Russia's Arctic

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

The question

Russia’s Arctic is run by a small number of state corporations and private groups. Rosatom operates the Northern Sea Route, Novatek drives the Arctic gas projects, and a handful of shipyards build and repair the submarines and ships of the Northern Fleet. This project maps who owns and manages them, how they connect to one another, and how close each sits to Putin and his inner circle.

Why it matters

Decisions about the Arctic are taken by people, not by institutions in the abstract. Knowing who holds influence, and through which channels, helps explain how Russia will respond to sanctions, to the war’s demands on its industry and to a more contested Arctic. For companies, the same map shows where sanctions exposure and reputational risk lie in a supply chain or a partnership.